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THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Sean Byrne, Cynthia Irvin, Eyob Fissuh, and Chris Cunningham

Abstract

External economic assistance from the International Fund for Ireland and the
European Union Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation assisted in
setting the context of the Northern Ireland peace agenda, and holds out the promise
of a new civic culture. This article explores people's perceptions of economic
assistance of conflict amelioration in Northern Ireland. Some of the findings, in
respect of inter-community differences in perceptions of the utility of external
economic assistance in building the peace dividend, are discussed in the paper.
Introduction
The closing years of the twentieth century brought renewed optimism that
sectarian tension and ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland could be resolved. After
years of failure and frustration, politicians negotiated a framework to devolve power
and build upon the fragile peace between the Catholics and Protestant communities.
The global community paid close attention as most of all major political parties in
Northern Ireland except for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) now comfortably
the largest Unionist party signed onto the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement
(GFA). However, to the frustration (and perhaps surprise) of many, those on the
ground slowly realized that the GF A cannot transform society and politics alone
(Ruane and Todd, 2000, 2001). Indeed, the crisis of identity in Northern Ireland is
so deep, that only an all-encompassing transformational approach to conflict
resolution--one that addresses components of the conflict beyond constitutional
matters, such as cross-communal relationships, political polarity, socioeconomic
status, and the challenge of identity politics, to name but a few--can empower the
people on both sides of the conflict well enough to embrace peace (Morrow, 2001;
Ruane and Todd, 1996).
This article covers an important aspect of settlement, given that the
statistical measurement of people's perceptions of economic assistance in conflict
amelioration in Northern Ireland had not been undertaken before our 1997 survey.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PlRA) had only just called its second
ceasefire when the data was gathered and no political deal had been clinched. Given
external funding for peace processes globally, the research here could have a wider
remit beyond Northern Ireland. The objective of this article is to examine public
perceptions of external economic assistance on the peacebuilding process in
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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Northern Ireland as manifested in the pre-GF A 1997 perceptions of respondents on
the role of these funds on community economic development, and on the reduction
of violence, and the role of these funds in building the peace dividend. Very
considerable economic resources have been committed to resolving the conflict, yet
we have little empirical evidence of their impact (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995).
Economic assistance fits in with the general civil society approach to conflict
resolution (Pearson, 2001; Sandole, 2002). Moreover, the article analyzes the effect
of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and European Union (EU) Special
Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation on sustainable economic
development in Northern Ireland. The article begins with a discussion of the role of
economic assistance in building the peace dividend in Northern Ireland. The
research findings and their implications are then highlighted.

Economic Assistance and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland today remain largely divided
over national issues of identity. Except for a growing middle class, the working
class lives largely in separate enclaves, attend different churches and schools, and
socially distance themselves from the other community (Byrne and Irvin, 2002).
Since partition in 1921, Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland have
competed for scarce resources in one of the poorest peripheries of the EU, which
has in part prompted bicommunal conflict (Byrne and Ayulo, 1998). Between 1920
and 1972, Unionist regimes used populist economic policies that favored its
Protestant majority while discriminating against the minority Catholics (Bew, et al.,
1979). Under unionist rule, there were few opportunities for Catholic Nationalists
while Protestant Unionists enjoyed all of the economic privileges of a populist
regime in Belfast, the capital of government in Northern Ireland before the 1972
introduction of British direct rule (Bew et al., 1979, 1995).
Unionist control institutionalized discriminatory practices against Catholics
creating large disparities between the two communities. The populist policies of the
Northern Ireland state manufactured discrimination in housing, employment, and
job creation that worked to the advantage of the Unionists and to the disadvantage
of the Nationalist community (Bew et al., 1979, 1995). Prior to the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) movement of the 1960s, Nationalists
were generally poorer and less educated than Unionists, and were two-and-a-half
times more likely to be unemployed (Dixon, 2001; McGarry and O'Leary, 1995;
Tomlinson, 1995).
Today, university entrance rates are similar for both
communities.
On a larger scale, British government policy also contributed to segregation
and alienation within society by its historic failure to address its economic woes.
Past British government policy often dealt only with symptoms not the root causes
of structural inequalities, and even then in manners which tended to exacerbate
rather than ameliorate competition between the two communities (Byrne and Irvin,
2002). British economic policy largely sought to stabilize the political status quo in
Northern Ireland, rather than try to resolve the underlying roots of the conflict.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
-2-

The Role of Economic Assistance in Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

"The Northern Ireland problem has not been high on Britain's political agenda, and
the government's major priority has been to limit the cost of this involvement; thus
the responses to economic inequality and unemployment can be described as
superficial and palliative" (Bew and Patterson, 1985, p. 75).
Economic negligence of N orthcrn Ireland's working classes leaves Britain
partly responsible for the feelings of alienation, distrust, and sectarianism felt in
both communities (Bew and Patterson, 1985).
Consequently, poverty and
unemployment, which reached over 70 percent for males over several generations in
urban communities supportive of Republican and Loyalist Paramilitaries, have
stricken nationalist communities across the region (Byrne and Irvin, 2001 ).
Northern Ireland's economy is arguably the most subsidized and public sector
dependent in Western Europe. It is true that much British finance was ploughed into
security, but the subvention went beyond this.
The IFI and the EU Fund were set up to support economic regeneration and
peacebuilding within Northern Ireland and the border area (Byrne and Irvin, 2001).
The IFI was established in 1985 after the British and Irish governments signed the
AJA to foster greater cooperation between both governments. London and Dublin
had stipulated that both governments sought to:
Promote the economic and social development of those areas of both
parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the
consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the
possibility of securing international support for this work (Anglo-Irish
Agreement, 1985, p. 2).
The AIA specifically established economic support fund assistance for United
States (US) contributions to the IFI; its language reflected the US' s belief of a
strong relationship between peace and economic development. The AJA proposed
"to provide for the US contributions in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement," so
that "all may live in peace, free from discrimination, terrorism, and intolerance and
with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and
processes of government" (Irvin and Byrne, 2002, p. 134). Economic development
was also seen as a means to building peace because it could improve the conditions
that bred violence.
The US initiated funding of the IFI with US $50 million in 1986, and
through 1996 had funded more than US $500 million (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
Other donors to the IFI include the EU, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The
EU contributed US $18.3 million per year from 1989 until 1994, when it increased
its annual contribution to approximately US $24.4 million per year supplanting the
US as the largest donor to the fund in response to the 1994 cease-fires between
paramilitary groups (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
Likewise, the EU positively responded to steps in the peace process. It
created a special economic task force designed to promote community ties and
dialogue, as well as strengthen and encourage existing political agreements with
economic incentives and support. This resulted in the 1994-1999 EU Special
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland, which primarily aims to
address unemployment and social exclusion, while maintaining momentum for
peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Byrne and Irvin, 2001). The European
Commission, which initiated the fund, promised US $393 million for the period
1994-1998, and has since proposed over US $220 in additional funds (Byrne and
Irvin, 2002). Combined with substantial EU structural funds for economically
depressed regions, the EU invested 1.2 billion ECU (US $1 .4 billion) as of 2000
(Irvin and Byrne, 2002, p. 135). Similar to the IFI, the Peace Fund aims to reinforce
peace and stability, and promote reconciliation, by increasing economic
development and employment; promoting urban and rural regeneration; developing
cross-border cooperation; and extending social inclusion (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
As a result of a vibrant marketing campaign by both the EU and IFI to
highlight both funds we might expect people to have a positive perception of
external economic assistance. The provision of both funds is important in
empowering the grassroots promoting social inclusion, boosting economic growth,
advancing socioeconomic regeneration, and reinforcing progress toward a peaceful
. society. It is important to explore this systematically.
Methodology
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The data analyzed are from a Northern Ireland public opm1on survey
constructed by Drs. Irvin and Byrne and conducted in August 1997 by Millward
Brown Ulster. The data-set is unique as it is the first empirical study to examine
public perceptions of economic assistance to Northern Ireland. Both senior authors
commissioned Millward Brown Ulster to assess the public perceptions of the impact
of funding from the IFI and from the EU Special Support Program for Peace and
Reconciliation. A representative sample of 610 adults (18+) were interviewed from
August 6 to 8, 1997 by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the
definitive quality standards of the Interviewer Quality Control Scheme. All
interviews were carried out face-to-face at 50 sampling points selected at random
throughout Northern Ireland normally in each respondent's home. Two of the
interviews were excluded from the data set as they were defective. Missing values
and "I don't know" responses were removed from the analyses. This reduced the
effective sample to less than 608 in all the cases. The stratified random sample was
controlled by gender, age, class, and religion. The dependent variables are the
perceptions of the contribution of funds: toward peace, toward reducing violence,
towards one's own community economic development, and the economic situation
of the person that last three years.
This study employs a special class of regression techniques in general and
quantitative response models in particular in testing some hypotheses. More
specifically binary probit and ordered probit models are employed for the binary
dependent variables and ordinal dependent variables respectively (Greene, 2003).
This section develops the key characteristics of these models. Special emphasis is
given to the interpretation of the coefficients as it is very crucial to our discussion.
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We start with the binary dependent variable models and then we proceed to the
ordered probit model.
As in Wooldrige (2002) we employ the binary dependent variable
regression model of the form

E[y Ix]= O[l-F(x' fJ)] + l[F(x' /J)]

= F(x' fJ)

1.0

Where x is kxn data matrix and /3 is kx 1 vector of the coefficients. It is noteworthy
that in the probability regression models (in our case we employ logistic and normal
distributions) we employ the parameters of the model, like those of the non-linear
models, which may not reflect the true marginal effects. That is to say the
coefficients are not the same as the marginal effects. Rather the generic marginal
effect form is given by,

aE[y Ix] = {dF(x' /J )}/J = .f(x' /J )fJ
ax
d(x'/J)
1.1
Where

.f(.)

is the density function that corresponds to the cumulative probability

distribution function, F(.). As it is clear from equation (1.1) to get the marginal
effect we need to weight the slope by probability density. Hence, for a binary probit
model the marginal effect would be given by:

aE[y/ x]
ax

= {dF(x'/J)}/J = <fJ(x'/J)/J
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where <fJ(t) is the standard normal density.

a Prob(y

=f

ax
1.4

This is what we have reported in Table 1. Equation (1.1) also illustrates that the
value of the marginal effect depends on the level of all variables ( X; ). This leaves
us with a decision about the values of the variables to be used to compute these
effects. In our case the marginal effects are calculated at mean values of all other
variables. But this approach is not without flaws. First, given the nonlinear nature
of the model it is not an easy task to translate the marginal effects into changes in
the predicted probability that will occur if there is discrete change in one of the
variables. This is pertinent to our modeling because most of our explanatory
variables are binary outcomes. To get around this problem we calculate the
difference at the values of 1 and 0. Keeping this in mind the results could be
interpreted as follows. Let us take the marginal effect of the variable GENDER on
the perceived effect of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on violence in
Model 5, Table 1. For a male individual respondent the predicted probability of
perceiving the contribution of the IFI and EU economic assistance positively is
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higher by 0.234(23.4 percent) than his female counterparts keeping all other
variables constant. All the other coefficients can be interpreted likewise.
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Ordered Probit
We have also used an ordered probit model for perceptions about the importance of
the !FI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on economic development. As is
common in the literature we will motivate the usage of ordered probit with a latent
variable approach as we assume that there is a continuous unobservable function,
which maps into the observed categories. Similar to the binary response models the
coefficients in these models, the parameters, are not marginal effects. We can
illustrate this point in the case of three ordinary value variables as follows:
In the mode of the importance of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation
fund on one's own economic development we have three categories, which are:
important ( y = 2 ), neutral ( y = l, neither important nor unimportant), and not
important ( y = 0 ). In this case because we have three categories our model has
only one unknown threshold parameter. Note that our model also has a constant.
The three probabilities are given by:
Prob(y = 0 / x) = l-<l>(X'/3)
Pr ob(y = 1/ x) = <I>(µ - X' /3) - <I>(- X' /3)
1.3
Prob(y = 21 X) = 1-<1>(µ-X'/3)
and the marginal effects of changes in the three regressors are

aPr ob(y = 0 IX) = -rj)(X' /J)/J
ax
aProb(y = 0 IX) =[rp(-X' /3)- rp(µ _ X' /3)]/3
ax
1.4

aPr ob~X= 21 X) = rp(µ _ X' /3) /3
As the above equations demonstrate with the exception of the outcome y
outcome

y

=J

and

=0, we cannot a priori state that a positive (negative) parameter also

implies that probability rises (falls) with X; because it will depend on the relative

ence m
;:3~ility of
· \·ely is

densities in equation (1 .4). Similar to our binary response model it is important to
note that the marginal effect of the dummy variable needs special attention. For
example, in all of our models GENDER is a dummy variable and since it is a
discrete variable the marginal effect reported is a discrete change. We analyze this
discrete change by comparing the probabilities that result when the variable takes its
two different values with those that occur with the other variables held at their
sample means.
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Unlike the binary probit models in the case of ordered probit models the
interpretation of the marginal effects is not straightforward. Instead interpretation in
terms of odds ratio is simple. For example, from Model 5 in Table 1 the odds of the
perception of Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) supporters being in favor of the
positive role of the IFJ and EU Peace and Reconciliation funded projects versus the
combined outcome of perceiving the contribution to be from unfair to not fair at all
is lower by 1.03 times than other political party supporters.
With this in mind, we now tum to the issue of goodness of a model. There
is no one conventional measure of goodness of fit for these models. But in most
cases the very least measure that should be reported is the maximized value of the
log likelihood function. Thus, we have reported the log likelihood ratio and the
limiting x 2 values for all the models. It is also commonplace to report the actual
versus predicted probabilities. Another reliable and popular measure of goodness of
fit is the Hit and Miss table with the counted R 2 . However, it merits mention that
the usual R 2 value has no much value in these kind of nonlinear models. Besides
the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) does not try to fit using the prediction
of y as it is in a classical ordinary method (which maximizes R 2 ). Rather it is
chosen to maximize the joint density of the observed dependent variable
(Wooldridge, 2002).
Data and Key Variables

Following we briefly discuss the key independent variables that arc
employed in our data.
Political party: It is the task of this article to investigate any association of the
perception of the respondents about the importance of both of these funds to
economic development, and the importance of these funds to peaccbuilding and the
reduction of violence. We generated nine dummy variables for each of the political
parties. The ten political parties are: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), Alliance Party, Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), United
Kingdom Unionist Partycwrb nh g (UKUP), Conservative Party, Social Democratic
and Labor Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein (SF), the Women's Coalition Party, and the new
defunct Unionist Democratic Party (UDP). The main objective is to investigate any
systematic association between political affiliation and the perceptions of these
respondents. It is expected that the political affiliation of a respondent influence the
perception about the likely effects of these funds on peace building, the reduction of
violence, and economic development.
Class: Another key variable of interest in the hypotheses testing is the category of
the economic class a respondent belongs to. Three dummy variables were generated
to represent the three economic income classes-the ABCl (professional class), DE
(skilled class) and C2 (semi-skilled class). It is expected that all three classes,
especially the semi-skilled class will welcome economic assistance from both
funding agencies as unemployment is a serious issue in working class communities.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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Age: The variable age is also included as a determinant factor on the models
considered. It is expected that age will have an effect on the evaluation of citizens
about the respective funds. This way we will able to control the effect of age on the
models considered in this article.
Relation: The relation variable is a dummy variable that indicates the relationship a
person has with the funding agency. It is in effect expected to capture the benefits a
person reaps from any cross community project by its network effect. It is expected
that this variable will affect the perception of respondents on the role of these funds
in establishing peace and economic development. However, it is hard to a priori
postulate on the expected direction of effect. It is expected that those respondents
who have a personal tie to one or both of the funding agencies will be supportive of
their efforts to empower local communities.
Gender: A gender variable is also included in our model to indicate whether a
person is female or male. It is our expectation that gender will have a significant
effect in perception about the role of economic assistance on conflict resolution.
Gender assumes a value of 1 if a respondent is female and zero otherwise. It is our
expectation that females will be more favorable to the funding agencies efforts to
build a peaceful society than males.
Religion: It is well known that religion is a badge of identity for both communities
in the Northern Ireland conflict. To capture the role ofreligion the respondents were
classified into three religions groups, Catholic, Protestant and others. Accordingly
there arc three dummy variables for each religious group. The other religion group
is used as a reference group. It is expected that Catholics compared to Protestants
will be more favorable to the goals and objectives of both funding agencies.
Results

This section presents the regression estimates. Table 1 summarizes the
results of this analysis. The first model, Model 1, presents the probit model where
the dependent variable is perceived importance of the IFI and the EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund on the peace process in Northern Ireland. Model 2 reports a
probit model for the perceived role of these funds on the reduction of violence.
Model 3 presents an ordered probit model where the dependent variable is perceived
importance of· the IFI funds on community economic development. Model 4
presents an ordered probit model where the dependent variable is perceived
importance of the EU fund on community economic development. Finally, Model 5
presents a probit model where the dependent variable is a binary variable for the
personal economic situation of a respondent during the last three years before the
survey was conducted.
Model of Importance of IFI and EU Funded Projects to One's Own Economic
Development

This section examines the respondents' perceptions of the importance of
both the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on community economic
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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development. To examine this relationship two ordered probit models, Model 3 and
Model 4 were fitted. The dependent variable in each case has three categories,
"important", "neutral", and "not important," which assume values of 2, 1, and 0
respectively. The results from both models support the fact that the perception of
Catholics is less favorable than the perception of other religious groups on the role
IFI and EU funded projects play in the development of their communities. This
tends to support the claim by (Honaker, 2004) who argues that duration of
unemployment for Catholics is relatively higher than those for Protestants, i.e., the
exit rate is very low.
Also age has a positive and significant association with the perception of
the importance ofIFl and EU funded projects to one's community's development in
both models. The older a person is the higher the probability that the person is going
to recognize the importance of IFI and EU funded projects to her/his own
community economic development.
Gender is also found to be negative and statistically significant at less than
the 5 percent level in both models. More specifically the marginal effects suggest
that the probability that male respondents see a positive role for these funds on their
community's economic development are higher than their female counterparts. This
result may be explained by the fact that perhaps relatively few females are aware of
these funds in Northern Ireland. This finding in turn may also be explained by the
fact that more men are in positions of power and privilege in society than women,
which may emanate from a relative differential with regards to access to, and
knowledge of the funding agencies.
Models 3 and 4 also show that age and some political party identifiers are
statistically significant to warrant interpretation of the results. As far as political
affiliation is concerned the two models tend to produce different results. Model 3
shows that the probability of the perceptions of a respondent from the Conservative
Party and Women's Coalition party have higher chances of perceiving a positive
role of these funds on their community's development than the other respondents.
Moreover, in Model 4 only the dummy variable for the Women's Coalition party is
positive and significant at less than the I percentage level. Age is found to be
significant in both models. It is important to note that both the Conservative Party
and the Women's Coalition are very minor political parties and so the sample of
respondents supporting these parties would be very small and any conclusions to be
drawn from them must be treated with caution.
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We have also tried to explore the determinants of the economic situation of
a person three years before the survey was taken, which is expected to shed some
light on any possible link between economic growth and political party
membership. This analysis assumes that the economic situation of an individual
could be used as a proxy for economic growth. Model 6 in Table 1 reports the
marginal effects of the probit model for the economic situation of individuals the
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last three years before the survey. The regression output indicates that the variables
Age, Class (ABCl), and "Relation" included in the model are statistically
significant. One's perceived economic situation seems to have a positive correlation
with age. This may be explained in part by the productivity effect as suggested by
human capital theory.
Table 1: Binary prob it and ordered probit models
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Model 4
oE[ylx]

aE[yfx]
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aE[ylx]

z-stat

z-stat

ax

Relation

-0.057*

(-3.7)

-0.07

(-0.52)

-0.076

(-1.41)

Gender
Age
UUP
DUP
Alliance

0.088**
-0.001
-0.091 **
-0.313*
0.147

(l .92)
(-0.55)
(-1.83)
(-3.41)
(l .49)

0.14**
-0.12

(l.95)
(-1.23)

0.09
0.13
0.00

(0.92)
(0.71)
(0.02)

-0.437*
0.015*
-0.207
0.030
-0.216

(-2.79)
(3.33)
(-0.94)
(0. l)
(-0.74)

0.014*
-0.048
0.001
0.032

(-1.67)
(2.59)
(-0.2)
(0.0)
(0.1)

0.234***
-0.0156*
0.204
-0.15
-0.355

(-1.72)
(-3.53)
(0.96)
(-0.52)
(-1.08)
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-0.010**
-0.214
-0.144
0.022

PlJP
UDP

-0.378*
0.108

(-2.64)

0.42**
0.01
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(0.05)

0.286
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(0.66)
(0.49)

0.153
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(0.34)
(0.34)
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(-2.65)
(0.47)
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UKUP
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(-0.23)

(-1.74)

-0.292

(-0.53)
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(-0.78)

-0.29

(-0.4)

-0.267

Conservative
Party
SDLP
Sinn Fein
Woman Coalition
ABCl class
C2 class

0.016
0.07
-0.068
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0.054
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(1.02)
(-0.74)
(-0 l I)
(2.141)
(0.054)
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*
-0.15
-0.22
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0.788
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(1.31)

0.805***
0.358
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Predicted
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Wald chi square

61.04
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Observations

268
451
451
509
509
Source: August 1997 Millward Brown Ulster Survey. Note: * significant at 1% level**
Significant at 5% level;*** significant at I 0% level . "calculated at mean value.
Model 1: dependent variable contribution of funds towards peace
Model 2: dependent variable contribution of funds towards reducing violence
Model 3: dependent variable importance of the IFI funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 4: dependent variable importance of the EU funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 5: dependent variable imponance of the EU and IFJ funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 6: dependent variable economic situation of the person the last three years
Note: In 1999, the Unionist Democratic Party (UDP) disbanded.

Table 2: Hit and Miss Tables
Model 2

Model 1
Actual

Actual

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

261

127

388

No

52

69

121

Total

313

196

509

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

97

40

137

No

41

90

131

138

130

268

Total

Model 3
Actual

Model4
Actual

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

261

127

388

No

52

69

121

Total

313

196

509

Predicted
Yes
No
Total

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

97

40

137

No

41

90

131

Total

138

130

268

Model 5
Actual
Yes
No
Total

295
18

313

112
26
138

407
44

451

Source : August 1997 Millward Brown Ulster Survey
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509

•., level**

__ mmunity
:-cmmunity
:ornmunity _
: years

Total

137

l3l
_58

~Ota.I

451

According to human capital theory age earnings profile is usually a concave
function. If we assume the person's economic situation is highly dependent on
individual earnings the positive coefficient of age in the model is not unexpected.i
Further, the economic situation of the last three years before the survey was taken is
positively related to the ABC 1 economic class. The probability that the economic
situation of a person from the professional class ABC 1, improving her or his
situation during the last three years of the survey is higher than the respondents in
the other economic strata. What is more striking is that the relationship that a person
has with the funding agency has a positive and significant correlation with her or his
economic situation, i.e., the coefficient of "Relation" is positive and significant.
More specifically the probability that the perceived economic situation of a person
who has a good relationship with the funding agency to be at a better economic
position in society is about 0.17 4 higher than a person who has no relationship with
either of the funding agencies community development officers. This finding may
suggest some form of favoritism or positive spillovers from such projects either in
terms of the allocation of aid or employment. The finding may also imply the
significance of personal relationships and connections within the culture, which
would need a separate treatment with appropriate techniques. Thus, financial
assistance instead of having a curative role for the political problem may have the
potential to aggravate conflicts by increasing inequality in the society. This may
also imply that economic aid by itself may not be enough to transform the conflict
and should be complemented with political solutions. It is worth noting that except
for the three variables discussed no variable is significant in the regression model.
Our model has also reasonable strength of goodness of fit. The log
likelihood ratio, which follows, X 2 (37.79) is found to be large enough to reject the
null hypothesis of the coefficient vector, which is zero. In addition, the Hit and Miss
table report in Table 2 illustrates that the counted R 2 to be 0.71. Likewise, the
counted R 2 can also be calculated from the Hit and Miss table for the other models.

Contribution of Cross Community Projects to Peace
In this section we examine the perceived contribution of cross community
projects to peace. In other words, we explore any systematic relationship between
financial assistance and peace in Northern Ireland by estimating a binary probit
model. Model 1 in Table 1 reports the probit model. The findings have far reaching
implications for the role of economic assistance to completely solve ethnopolitical
conflicts.
Before discussing the results in Table 1 we need to explain the construction
of the dependent variable, which was constructed from an answer to the question
"do you think that community projects have helped to bring about peace?" The
response categories are yes, no, or I don't know. The "I don't know" options were
excluded from the regression analysis so that the estimated model is a non-linear
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probability model with binary response. Accordingly, a probit model was estimated.
Some of the implications from the regression analysis are now outlined.
Model I in Table I reports the probit model with the dependent variable being
the perceived contribution of the IFI and the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on
the peace process. According to Model I not all the explanatory variables are
statistically significant. We discuss the variables, which have statistically significant
coefficients.
RELATION: The relationship of a respondent to the funding agencies has a
positive effect on the perception towards the contribution of community projects to
peace. The closer a respondent is to the funding agency the higher the chances are
that she or he feels it is going to contribute to peace. Recall from the previous
section that this variable had a positive effect in Model 4 where the dependent
variable is the perceived economic situation of the respondent. This may imply two
things. The first straight forward implication is that the perception of individuals
who are closer to the funding agencies may be biased in their assessment. Another
possibility is that because these people are closer to the funding agencies
community development officers they might have an information advantage, which
enabled them to evaluate the true impact of these funds on their own lives and on
the society. Which one is more dominant is a question for further research.
However, these results indicate the prospect for a positive role of these funds on
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland.
PUP and DUP: Model 1 also shows that the supporters of PUP and DUP are
less likely to perceive the importance of cross community projects to building peace
than those from other political parties. In other words, our results suggest that the
supporters of the PUP and DUP perceive that the cross community projects funded
by the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund have done nothing to maintain or
contribute to the peace process. The DUP's support for the GFA is lukewarm.
ABC/ Class: One's membership of ABCI class relative to DE class increases
the probability of perceiving the projects' contribution towards peace positively.
This is not surprising. The coefficient of the ABC 1 class was positive and
significant in Model 6 which suggests a probability of improvement in the economic
situation of a person from ABCl class relative to the other economic income
classes. Thus, the fact that the ABC l class is witnessing an improvement in its
economic situation indicates it might have a positive assessment of the role of these
funds on peace. Membership in the ABC 1 class increases the probability of
perceiving the contribution these funds make to the peace process by about 11
percent compared to the other two classes keeping all other things constant.
We observe that those in the ABC I professional class tend to see the
contribution to be more positive than those in the semi-skilled and skilled classes.
Another variable worth noting is the respondent's relation with the funding agency.
The negative coefficient indicates that there is a positive association between the
perceptions of a person towards the contribution of the cross community projects
funded by the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund to peacebuilding. It is
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worth remembering that the value of the variable "RELATION" is in descending
order, a large number means an unfavorable relation.
We have also conducted a joint test for political parties, class, and religion.
A joint test for the political party dummy variables demonstrates that the political
party affiliation identifiers arc jointly significant, even though not all individual
dummy variables for the respective political parties were statistically significant.
The interpretation of this result is that the party affiliation of respondents as a whole
is statistically significant in affecting the perception of the IFI and the EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund towards pcaccbuilding. With regards to the religion variables,
the coefficients were significant neither individually nor jointly. Hence, the
probability of perceiving the contribution of economic assistance to peacebuilding
does not vary by religious affiliation. Finally, a joint test for age groups shows that
the age variables were significant neither jointly nor individually.
Goodness of Fit
The log likelihood ratio which follows 2 is found to be large enough to
reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient vector, which is zero. In addition, the log
likelihood value at the globally optimal point is reported to be about -309. As it is
more common and more reasonable we report the power of our model using the Hit
and Miss table. Table 2 reports that the counted R 2 to be about 65 percent.

z

Specification Test
We have also conducted a normality test for the probit models. For these
tests we use the loglikelihood test as follows
-

ALR

~

a

= -2[Lr (,8)- Lur (,8)]~ x;

Note that the null hypothesis is the distribution of the error terms, which is normal.
The null hypothesis of normality test for Model 1 shows that the Arn is 0.56 so that
we do not reject the hypothesis. Thus, our probit model is justified. The same was
also done for Model 2 and Model 6. The results show that the null hypothesis is
rejected at less than the 1 percent level.
Perceived Effect ofIF/ and EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund on Violence
Using a binary response mode, this section analyses the response to the
following question: "do you believe IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund
economic support has helped in the reduction of violence?" The possible responses
are: "yes", "no" and "don't know." More specifically, we estimate a probit model
for the perceived contribution of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund's
economic assistance on the reduction of violence. Model 2 in Table I presents the
results of this exercise. The dependent variable is a binary outcome, which assumes
0 if the response is "no," and 1 if the response is "yes." The probit equation in Table
l indicates that not all of the factors included in the regression analysis have a
significant effect on the perceived impact of economic assistance in reducing
violence in Northern Ireland.
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 13, Number 2
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Gender: All things being equal, the probability of a male respondent perceiving a
positive role for the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund's economic
assistance to reduce violence is lower by 14 percent than a female counterpart. All
things being equal the probability of a person from ABCl class perceiving a
positive role of IFI and EU financial assistance is higher than for a person from the
DE class. Our probit model suggest that the probability of rating the impact of the
IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on the reduction of violence is negatively
associated with PUP, UK.UP, and Conservative Party affiliation.
The model has also a very good fit when we look at the overall predicted
probability in comparison with the observed probability. Its goodness of fit is
indeed remarkable while the observed and our predicted probabilities are 0.49 and
0.48 respectively. This gives the model more predicted capacity as it seems to fit the
data well. The hit and miss table shows that the counted R 2 is about 70 percent. A
specification test was also conducted to check if there is any fragility in our
estimates. The specification test shows that the results are indeed tenable to the
problem of endogeneity. We have also conducted a normality test by employing the
predicted values (x' /J) and (x' /J) 2 in our model to calculate the restricted and
unrestricted likelihood values. The likelihood test of normality does not reject the
null hypothesis of normality. As can be seen from the Hit and Miss table the
percentage of correctly classified responses in our model, the counted R square, is
about 70 percent. This is a remarkably high goodness of fit.
Discussion

Overall, the public opinion data suggest that economic assistance properly
administered may play a key role in fostering an environment conducive to the
peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. Clearly, the respondents
recognized the link between prosperity and the fact that peace is the end of the long
war. The positive marginal effects of the minor political parties within Northern
Ireland--Conservative party and Women's Coalition party in Model 3 and 4 are
supportive of this argument. Thus, the role of economic assistance coupled with the
1998 GF A may be important in building peace over the long-term. Both
Governments built confidence building mechanisms into the GF A to reform the
police, decommission paramilitary arms, release prisoners, and withdraw
emergency legislation (Wilford, 2000). In 1994, the EU created the Special Support
Program for Peace and Reconciliation to support the political process and build the
peace dividend. In addition, the IFI's economic assistance and President Clinton's
visits to Northern Ireland resulted in the Catholic community and a slight majority
of Protestants support for the 1998 GF A (Byrne, 2002). Hence, the GF A will not
provide an immediate political solution to the deep-rooted causes of the Northern
Ireland conflict. In addition, the impact of both of these funds on the political
process may be negative as they might have had an adverse effect by further
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alienating already isolated Unionists. The negative marginal effects of the
respondents from the PUP and UUP, UKUP and DUP in Model I suggest that
Unionists do not perceive that the funds will build a lasting peace in Northern
Ireland. The GF A "is neither a solution to the Irish question nor a blueprint for
government, it is a framework to build consensus" (Cox, 1999, p. 66). By 2002,
only one-third of Protestants supported the GFA (MacGinty, 2003).
In the current climate Unionist mistrust of the peace process is indicative of
mainstream Unionist uneasiness over the decommissioning of Republican and
Loyalist arms, and prisoner release means less Unionist confidence in the GF A to
resolve the conflict (Aughey, 2000; Dixon, 2000). The negative marginal effects of
the PUP and UUP, UKUP and DUP in Model 1 are supportive of this argument.
The GF A includes the Unionist community negotiating with SF that it vilifies as
terrorists, and a SF who has abandoned support for political violence in pursuit of
the goal of a united Ireland that it has fought to achieve for over thirty years (Cox,
Guelke and Stephen, 2000, p.5).
Moreover, Honaker (2004) used available data to estimate the separate
. unemployment rates for Protestants and Catholics. He found that unemployment
leads to images of economic discrimination and is a significant causal mechanism
for the intensity of conflict in Northern Ireland. Catholics still remain twice as likely
to be long-term unemployed as Protestants (Byrne and Irvin, 2002). Currently,
Republicans traded the long war to be part of the political process of government in
Northern Ireland, to address human rights, policing, prisoner release, equality,
poverty and unemployment that marginalized Catholics in the past (Coakley, 2003;
Irvin and Byrne, 2002). In this study, we found that the probability that Catholics
will perceive the funded projects as very important to their community's economic
development is much lower than Protestants. Catholics, in particular, were excluded
and marginalized by the Unionists, and lacked material advantage. Moreover, it is
within the SF respondents in the survey that we see a belief in the positive role of
the funding agencies in addressing economic disadvantage, and in reducing the
levels of violence in Northern Ireland.
This finding is in contrast to that of the professional and skilled Unionist
classes where there is minimal support for the idea that economic assistance can
provide more economic opportunities and reduce the level of violence. The
Unionists rank the PIRA as the net beneficiary of the Troubles. Further, a lower
level of recognition of the existence of the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund by
Protestant respondents indicates that the lower level of applications for EU funding
in Protestant areas may be due to the lack of a local community infrastructure when
compared to the Catholic community. Moreover, fewer unemployed Protestants
compared to Catholics perceived the distribution of IFI funds between both
communities to be fair. This finding is noticeable when we compare the Unionist
with Nationalists. Protestants initially boycotted what they termed as IFI blood
money from America (Byrne, 2002).
In general, Protestants find the distribution of the IFI and EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund unfair. They perceive that Catholics are receiving all of the
benefits of both funds. This finding may also be related to the complexity of the
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume I 3, Number 2
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application process suggesting that the funds are escalating sectarian conflict rather
than transforming it. Similarly, a post-2003 Northern Ireland Election Survey found
that Unionists shared a strong belief that the 1998 GF A benefits Nationalists at the
expense of Unionists (Dowds, Hayes and McAllister, 2005). In other words,
Protestants perceive economic gains for Catholics as a deficit for their community
promoting sectarianism rather than cooperation. Unionists have a "historic culture
of fatalism, a culture of suspicions of the intentions of those outside that Unionist
family and even more suspicious of the intentions, even the best intentions of those
within it" (Aughey, 2000, p.185).
In 1994, the EU consulted with community groups in its development of the
peace package. Yet, far fewer respondents in this sample are aware of either EU or
IFI funded projects in their communities. The professional and skilled classes are
more aware of funded projects and both agencies. Perhaps the skills to access
economic assistance from the funding agencies remains confined to certain classes.
The amount of red tape hampering applications was certainly illustrated in other
studies of community group leader's attitudes toward the funding process (Byrne
and Ayulo, 1998; Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002) while funding agencies target the
areas of greatest needs. Thus, the funding agencies need to streamline the
application process to make it more user-friendly.
Fitzduff and O'Hagan (2002) make the point that economic assistance from
the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund has empowered the community sector in the
grassroots to work for constructive socioeconomic and political change and has
assisted in stabilizing the conflict in Northern Ireland. This point is not completely
convincing given the aforementioned results. Our findings tend to indicate that the
funds are only perceived to be beneficial to certain groups in the society.
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Conclusion
Even though the contribution of the IFI and EU in financial terms is
dwarfed by that coming from the British government they arc important as part of
engaging civil society in a multi-track intervention peace process. By examining the
role of external economic aid in Northern Ireland's polarized society, this article
suggests that peacebuilding is, as Byrne and Irvin (2002) put it, "a process
comprised of a multiplicity of interdependent roles, functions and activities as an
effective strategy to help resolve ethnic conflict" (p. 58). External economic
funding is one of several intervention activities that must be integrated into a
transdisciplinary strategy of conflict transformation enhanced by a coordinated,
multimodal, and complementarity approach at multiple levels of intervention (Byrne
2001 ab). Other activities that can contribute to conflict resolution include: citizen
empowerment and participatory democratic initiatives, cultural tradition initiatives,
education for mutual understanding, integrated education efforts, urban planning
peacekeeping strategies, mediation training, civic education, and a storytelling
process to address past traumas (Bollens, 2000; Byrne, 2001ab; Senehi 2000). "A
comprehensive peacebuilding approach creates, therefore, a critical space or
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landscape that builds upon people in their own setting" (Lederach, 1997, p. 12).
Only a transformational approach to conflict resolution can empower members of
ethnic groups sufficiently to reduce conflict. A multi-modal and transdisciplinary
approach to conflict resolution that encompasses and draws from every approach
can produce rapid change in societies tom by conflict and empower citizens (Byrne
and Keashly, 2000).
Economic assistance as part of a multi-track intervention process within the
political framework of the GF A has the potential to build a lasting peace in
Northern Ireland. Ultimately, the power of the GFA, its potential, and its constraints
can all be found within the roots of its purpose. "There may be quibbling about the
(GFA's) institutional superstructure but if it is going to succeed it will be because of
the values which form its foundations" (Thompson, 1999, p. 263). Indeed, the
importance of the GFA's emphasis on consent, diversity, parity of esteem, and
commitment to exclusively peaceful means cannot be overstated, because fear
motivates violence (Thompson, 1999). The GF A is functional because it seeks to
directly resolve fear. It aims to bring to an end an ethnic conflict by reassuring the
two communities that they have a right to their identity (Thompson, 1999).
The GF A cannot transform into a sustainable peace accord without further
progress by the political parties because it has failed to significantly impact hostile
relationships and attitudes, and has not aided in the demise of political polarity
(MacGinty 2003). However, the overarching lesson here is that at least in the case
of protracted ethnopolitical conflict no treaty, document or economic assistance
package on its own can transform societies plagued by ethnic violence as the work
toward the resolution of these conflicts can only occur through genuine discussions
and communication (Byrne, 2000). But the responsibility belongs to the political
parties, and the GF A has at least built them a vehicle to get to peace.
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